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Abstract
We propose a notion of algorithmic stability for scenarios where cardinal preferences are
elicited. Informally, our definition captures the idea that an agent should not experience a large
change in their utility as long as they make “small” or “innocuous” mistakes while reporting their
preferences. We study this notion in the context of fair and efficient allocations of indivisible
goods among two agents, and show that it is impossible to achieve exact stability along with
even a weak notion of fairness and even approximate efficiency. As a result, we propose two
relaxations to stability, namely, approximate-stability and weak-approximate-stability, and show
how existing algorithms in the fair division literature that guarantee fair and efficient outcomes
perform poorly with respect to these relaxations. This leads us to the explore the possibility
of designing new algorithms that are more stable. Towards this end we present a general
characterization result for pairwise maximin share allocations, and in turn use it to design an
algorithm that is approximately-stable and guarantees a pairwise maximin share and Pareto
optimal allocation for two agents. Finally, we present a simple framework that can be used
to modify existing fair and efficient algorithms in order to ensure that they also achieve weak-
approximate-stability.
1 Introduction
The starting point of our work is Spliddit (www.spliddit.org), a not-for-profit fair division website
which has attracted thousands of users and aims to provide provably fair solutions for a number
of different settings [GP15]. One of the settings that is considered on Spliddit is the well-studied
problem of allocating a set of m indivisible goods among n ≥ 2 agents. For this setting, Spliddit
comes up with a fair allocation in the following way. First, it asks the agents to divide 1000 points
among the goods, thus in turn making them indicate their value for the goods. Given these values,
Spliddit computes a fair and efficient allocation, in particular guaranteeing to the users that the
computed solution is Pareto optimal (PO) and satisfies a fairness notion called EF1. Informally, in
an allocation that satisfies EF1 an agent i does not envy agent j after she removes some good from
j’s bundle, whereas Pareto optimality of an allocation implies that there is no other allocation where
every agent receives at least as much utility and at least one of the agents strictly more. Given our
current state of knowledge on fair and efficient allocations, Spliddit essentially provides the best-
known guarantees, in particular ensuring an EF1 and PO allocation by computing a maximum
Nash welfare solution (MNW)—i.e., an allocation that maximizes the product of the utilities of the
agents [Car+16].
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A B
g1 104 162
g2 273 250
g3 186 240
g4 437 348
(1a) Original instance
A B
g1 105 162
g2 271 250
g3 186 240
g4 438 348
(1b) Instance where agent A makes minor mistakes
Although Spliddit does a great job in making fair division algorithms more accessible, it is our
view that there is at least one aspect with respect to which it is lacking. The issue we are going to
discuss is not specific to Spliddit, but, as we hope to convince the reader, is something that can be
raised with respect to many situations in which cardinal preferences are elicited. Nevertheless, we
use Spliddit here since our motivation to look at this issue stemmed from observing an example on
it that is similar to the one we will talk about next. To illustrate our concern, consider the following
example. There are two agents (A and B) and four goods (g1, · · · , g4) that need to be fairly divided
among them. The agents have additive valuation functions and the values that they attribute for
each of these goods are in Table 1a. Spliddit computes an EF1 and PO solution for this instance
using the MNW solution and the final allocation has agent A getting goods g2 and g4, and agent
B getting goods g1 and g3. So far so good. However, what if agent A made a minor ‘mistake’
while reporting the values and instead reported the values given in Table 1b? Note that the two
valuations (i.e., A’s original one and the ‘mistake’ in Tables 1a and 1b, respectively) are almost
identical, with the value of each good being off by at most 2. Therefore, intuitively, it looks like we
would ideally like to have similar outputs—and more so given the fact that the MNW allocation for
the original instance satisfies EF1 and PO even with respect to this new instance. However, does
the MNW solution do this? No, and in fact, the allocation in this case is agent A getting good g4
alone and agent B getting the other three. This in turn implies that agent A is losing roughly 38%
of their utility for the ‘mistake’ (since according to their true values, agent A gets a total utility
of 437 when making the ‘mistake’, whereas gets 437+273 when reporting correctly), which seems
highly undesirable.
The example described above is certainly not one-off, and in fact we will show later how there are
far worse examples for different algorithms from the literature on fair allocations. More broadly,
we believe that this is an issue that can arise in many problems where the inputs are assumed to be
cardinal preferences. After all, it is not hard to imagine scenarios from our own lives where most of
us would find it hard to attribute exact numerical values to our preferences. Now, of course, it is
easy to see that if we insist on resolving this issue completely—meaning, if we insist that the agent
making the ‘mistake’ should not experience any change in their outcome—then it cannot be done
in any interesting way as long as we allow the ‘mistakes’ to be arbitrary and also insist that the
algorithm be deterministic.1 However, what if we make some assumption on the type of ‘mistakes’
the agents might commit? For instance, what if we make a mild assumption that any ‘mistake’
reported by the agent at least maintains the underlying ordinal information? That is, being more
specific in the context of our example, what if we assume that if an agent considers good g to
be the r-th highest valued good according to their true preference, then in the ‘mistake’ too this
information is maintained? Note that this is indeed the case in the example mentioned above, and
so, more broadly, these are the kind of scenarios that we consider in this paper. Our goal is to try
1Although there is work on randomized fair allocations (e.g., [BM01; BCKM13]), as pointed out by Caragiannis
et al. [Car+16], randomization is not appropriate for many practical fair division settings where the outcomes are
just used once.
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and address the issue that we observe in the example, and intuitively we want to design algorithms
were an agent does not experience a large change in their utility as long as their report is only off
by a little (and as long as the report maintains the ordinal information in their true preference).
Before we make this more concrete, a reader who is familiar with the algorithmic game theory (AGT)
literature might have the following question: “Why not just consider ordinal algorithms?” After
all, these algorithms will have the property mentioned above under the assumption of maintaining
the underlying ordinal information, and moreover there is quite a lot of work in the AGT literature
that focuses on designing algorithms that only use the underlying ordinal information and still
provide good guarantees with respect to different objectives in several scenarios (e.g., see [Bou+15;
AS16; AZ17; GKM17; AA18]). Additionally, and more specifically in the context of fair allocations,
there is also a line of work that considers ordinal algorithms [BEL10; BKK14; AGMW15; SAH17].
While this is certainly a reasonable approach, there are a few reasons why this is inadequate: i)
Constraining algorithms to use only the underlying ordinal information, thus ignoring the cardinal
values, might be too restrictive in certain settings. In fact, as we will show later, this is indeed the
case for the problem of designing fair and efficient algorithms. In particular, we show that there
are no ordinal algorithms that achieve EF1 and even approximate Pareto optimality. Additionally,
we also believe that assuming that the agents only have ordinal rankings might be too pessimistic
in certain situations. ii) Even if we ignore the previous concern, there are systems like Spliddit
that are used in practice and which explicitly elicit cardinal preferences, and so we believe that our
approach will be useful in such settings.
Given this, we believe that there is need for a new notion to address this issue. We term this
stability, and informally our notion of stability captures the idea that the utility experienced by
an agent should not change much as long as they make “small” or “innocuous” mistakes when
reporting their preferences.2 Although the general idea of algorithmic stability is certainly not new
(see Section 3 for a discussion), to best of our knowledge, the notion of stability we introduce here
(formally defined in Section 2.1) has not been previously considered. Therefore, we introduce this
notion in the context of problems where cardinal preferences are elicited, and explicitly advocate
for it to be considered during algorithm or mechanism design. This in turn constitutes what we
consider as our main contribution. We believe that if the algorithms for fair division—and in fact
any problem where cardinal preferences are elicited—are to be truly useful in practice they need
to have some guarantees on stability, and so towards this end we consider the problem of designing
stable algorithms in the context of fair allocation of indivisible goods among two agents.
We begin by formally defining the notion of stability and show how in general one cannot hope
for completely stable algorithms that are EF1 and even approximately Pareto optimal. This in
turn implies that one has to relax the strong requirement of stability, and towards this end we
propose two relaxations, namely, approximate-stability and weak-approximate-stability, where the
latter notion, as the name suggests, is strictly weaker than the former. Following this, we show
how existing algorithms from the literature on fair allocations that are fair and efficient perform
quite poorly even in terms of these relaxed notions of stability. This implies that one has to design
new algorithms, and towards this end we present a simple, albeit exponential, algorithm for two
agent fair division that is approximately-stable and that guarantees to return an allocation that
2In the economics and computation literature, the term stability is usually used in the context of stable algorithms
in two-sided matching [GS62]. Additionally, the same term is used in many different contexts in the computer science
literature broadly (e.g., in learning theory, or when talking about, say, stable sorting algorithms). Our choice of the
term stability here stems from the usage of this term in learning theory (see Section 3 for an extended discussion)
and therefore should not be confused with the notion of stability in two-sided matching.
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is pairwise maximin share (PMMS) and Pareto optimal. The algorithm is based on a general
characterization result for PMMS allocations (i.e., for the n agents case) which we believe might
potentially be of independent interest. Finally, we end by considering the weaker relaxation of
stability, and here we show how a small change to the existing two-agent fair division algorithms
can get us weak-approximate-stability along with the properties that these algorithms otherwise
satisfy.
2 Preliminaries
Let [n] = {1, · · · , n} denote the set of agents and G = {g1, · · · , gm} denote the set of indivisible
goods that needs to divided among these agents. Throughout, we assume that every agent i ∈ [n]
has an additive valuation function vi : 2
G → Z≥0,
3 where V denotes the set of all additive valuation
functions, vi(∅) = 0, and additivity implies that for a S ⊆ G (which we often refer to as a bundle),
vi(S) =
∑
g∈S vi({g}). For ease of notation, we often omit {g} and instead just write it as vi(g).
We also assume throughout that ∀i ∈ [n], vi(G) = T for some T ∈ Z
+, and that ∀g ∈ G, vi(g) > 0.
Although the assumption that agents have positive value for a good may not be valid in certain
situations, in Appendix A.1 we argue why this is essential in order to obtain anything interesting in
context of our problem. Finally, for S ⊆ G and k ∈ [n], we use Πk(S) to denote the set of ordered
partitions of S into k bundles, and for an allocation A ∈ Πn(G), where A = (A1, · · · , An), use Ai
to denote the bundle allocated to agent i.
In this paper we are interested in deterministic algorithms M : Vn → Πn(G) that produce fair
and efficient (i.e., Pareto optimal) allocations. For i ∈ [n] and a profile of valuation functions
(vi, v−i) ∈ V
n, we use vi(M(vi, v−i)) to denote the utility that i obtains from the allocation returned
by M. Pareto optimality and the fairness notions considered are defined below.
Definition 1 (β-Pareto optimality (β-PO)). Given a β ≥ 1, an allocation A ∈ Πn(G) is β-Pareto
optimal if
∀A′ ∈ Πn(G) :
(
∃i ∈ [n], vi(A
′
i) > β · vi(Ai)
)
⇒
(
∃j ∈ [n], vj(A
′
i) < vj(Aj)
)
.
In words, an allocation is β-Pareto-optimal if no agent can be made strictly better-off by a factor
of β without making another agent strictly worse-off; Pareto optimality refers to the special case
when β = 1. For allocations A,A′, we say that A′ β-Pareto dominates A if every agent receives at
least as much utility in A′ as in A and at least one agent is strictly better-off by a factor of β in A′.
We consider several notions of fairness, namely, pairwise maximin share (PMMS), envy-freeness up
to least positively valued good (EFX), and envy-freeness up to one good (EF1). Among these, the
main notion we talk about here (and design algorithms for) is PMMS, which is the strongest and
which implies the other two notions. Informally, an allocation A is said to be a PMMS allocation
if every agent i is guaranteed to get a bundle Ai that she values more than the bundle she receives
when she plays cut-choose with any other agent j (i.e., she partitions the combined bundle of her
allocation and the allocation Aj of j and receives the one she values less).
Definition 2 (pairwise maximin share (PMMS)). An allocation A ∈ Πn(G) is a pairwise maximin
share (PMMS) allocation if
∀i,∀j ∈ [n] : vi(Ai) ≥ max
B∈Π2(Ai∪Aj)
min{vi(B1), vi(B2)}.
3We assume valuations are integers to model practical deployment of fair division algorithms (e.g., adjusted
winner protocol, Spliddit). All the results hold even if we assume that the valuations are non-negative real numbers.
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Next, we define EFX and EF1, which as mentioned above are weaker than PMMS.
Definition 3 (envy free up to any positively valued good (EFX)). An allocation A ∈ Πn(G) is
envy-free up to any positively valued good (EFX) if
∀i,∀j ∈ [n],∀g ∈ Aj with vi(g) > 0 : vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {g}).
In words, an allocation is said to be EFX if agent i is no longer envious after removing any positively
valued good from agent j’s bundle.
Definition 4 (envy free up to one good (EF1)). An allocation A ∈ Πn(G) is envy-free up to one
good (EF1) if
∀i,∀j ∈ [n],∃g ∈ Aj : vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {g}).
In words, an allocation is said to be EF1 if agent i is no longer envious after removing some good
from agent j’s bundle.
In addition to the requirement that the algorithms be fair and efficient, we would also ideally like
it to be stable. We define the notion of stability (and its relaxations) in the next section.
2.1 Stability
At a high-level, our notion of stability captures the idea that an agent should not experience
a large change in utility as long as they make “small” or “innocuous” mistakes while reporting
their preferences. Naturally, a more formal definition requires us to first define what constitutes
a ‘mistake’ and what we mean by “small” or “innocuous” mistakes in the context of fair division.
So, below, for an i ∈ [n], vi ∈ V, and α > 0, we define what we refer to as α-neighbours of vi.
According to this definition, the closer α is to zero, the “smaller” is the ‘mistake’, since smaller
values of α indicate that agent i’s report v′i (which in turn is the ‘mistake’) is closer to their true
valuation function vi.
Definition 5 (α-neighbours of vi (α-N(vi))). For i ∈ [n], T ∈ Z
+, α > 0, and vi ∈ V, define
α-N(vi), the set of α-neighbouring valuations of vi, to be the set of all v
′
i such that
•
∑
g∈G v
′(g) = T (i.e., vi(G) = v
′
i(G)),
• ∀g,∀g′ ∈ G, v(g) ≥ v(g′)⇔ v′(g) ≥ v′(g′) (i.e., the ordinal information over the singletons is
maintained), and
• ‖v′i − vi‖1 =
∑
g∈G |v
′(g) − v(g)| ≤ α.4
Throughout, we often refer to the valuation function vi of agent i as its true valuation function
or true report and, for some α > 0, v′i ∈ α-N(vi) as its mistake or misreport. Note that although
true valuation function, true report, and misreport are terms one often finds in the mechanism
design literature which considers strategic agents, we emphasize that here we are not talking about
strategic agents, but about agents who are just unsophisticated in the sense that they are unable
to accurately convert their preferences into cardinal values. Also, although we write α > 0, it
should be understood that in the context of our paper, since the valuation functions of the agents
are integral, the only valid values of α are when it is an integer. We use this notation for ease of
exposition and because all our results hold even if we instead use real-valued valuations.
4We present our results using the L1-norm, although qualitatively they do not change if we use, say, the L∞-norm.
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Now that we know what constitutes a mistake, we can define our notion of stability.
Definition 6 (α-stable algorithm). For α > 0, an algorithm M is said to be α-stable if ∀i ∈
[n],∀vi,∀v−i, and ∀v
′
i ∈ α-N(vi),
vi (M(vi, v−i)) = vi
(
M(v′i, v−i)
)
. (1)
In words, for an α > 0, an algorithm is said to be α-stable if for every agent i ∈ [n] with valuation
function vi and all possible reports of the other agents, the utility agent i obtains is the same when
reporting vi and v
′
i.
5 Given the definition above, we have the following for what it means for an
algorithm to be stable.
Definition 7 (stable algorithm). An algorithm M is said to be stable if it is α-stable for all α > 0.
Although the “for all” in the definition above might seem like a strong requirement at first glance,
it is not, for one can easily show that the following observation holds. The proof appears in
Appendix B.1.
Observation 1. An algorithm M is stable if and only if there exists an α > 0 such that M is
α-stable.
It is important to note that the definition for an α-stable algorithm is only saying that the utility
agent i obtains (and not the allocation itself) when moving from vi to v
′
i is the same. Additionally,
although the notion of stability in general may look too strong, it is important to note that there are
several algorithms (e.g., the well-known EF1 draft mechanism [Car+16]) that satisfy this definition.
In particular, one can immediately see from the definition of stability that the following observation
holds in the context of ordinal algorithms—i.e., an algorithm that produces the same output for
input profiles (v1, · · · , vn) and (v
′
1, · · · , v
′
n) as long as ∀g, g
′ ∈ G, vi(g) ≥ vi(g
′)⇔ v′i(g) ≥ v
′
i(g
′).
Observation 2. Every ordinal fair division algorithm is stable.
In general, and as we will see in Section 4.2, the equality in (1) can be too strong a requirement.
Therefore, in the next section we propose two relaxations to the strong requirement of stability.
2.1.1 Approximate notions of stability
We first introduce the weaker relaxation which we refer to as weak-approximate-stability. Infor-
mally, weak-approximate-stability basically says that the utility that an agent experiences as a
result of reporting a neighbouring instance is not too far away from the what would have been
achieved if the reports were exact.5
Definition 8 ((ǫ, α)-weakly-approximately-stable algorithm). For an α > 0 and ǫ ≥ 1, an algo-
rithm M is said to be (ǫ, α)-weakly-stable if ∀i ∈ [n],∀vi,∀v−i, and ∀v
′
i ∈ α-N(vi),
1
ǫ
≤
vi (M(v
′
i, v−i))
vi (M(vi, v−i))
≤ ǫ. (2)
5At first glance, the definition for stable algorithms (or its relaxations defined in Section 2.1.1) might seem very
similar to the definition for (approximately) strategyproof algorithms (i.e., algorithms where truthful reporting is
an (approximately) weakly-dominant strategy for all the agents). Although there is indeed some similarity in these
definitions, it is important to note that these are different notions and neither does one imply the other. For instance,
there is a stable algorithm that is EF1 (one can easily see that the well-known EF1 draft algorithm [Car+16, Sec. 3]
is stable), but there is no strategyproof algorithm that is EF1 [ABCM17, App. 4.6].
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Although the definition above might seem like a natural relaxation of the notion of stability, as it
will become clear soon, it is a bit weak. Therefore, below we introduce the stronger notion which
we refer to as approximate-stability. However, before this we introduce the following, which, for a
given valuation function v, defines the set, equiv(v), of valuation functions v′ such that the ordinal
information over the bundles is the same in both v and v′.
Definition 9 (equiv(v)). For a valuation function v : 2G → Z≥0, equiv(v) refers to the set of all
valuation functions v′ such that for all S1, S2 ⊆ G,
v(S1) ≥ v(S2)⇔ v
′(S1) ≥ v
′(S2).
In words, equiv(v) refers to set all of valuation functions v′ such that v and v′ induce the same
weak order over the set of all bundles (i.e., over the set 2G). Throughout, for an i ∈ [n], we say
that two instances (or profiles) (vi, v−i) and (v
′
i, v−i) are equivalent if v
′
i ∈ equiv(vi). Also, we say
that vi and v
′
i are ordinally equivalent if v
′
i ∈ equiv(vi).
Equipped with this notion, we can now define approximate-stability. Informally, an algorithm is
approximately-stable if it is weakly-approximately-stable and if with respect to every instance that
is equivalent to the true reports, it is stable.
Definition 10 ((ǫ, α)-approximately-stable algorithm). For an α > 0 and ǫ ≥ 1, an algorithm M
is said to be (ǫ, α)-approximately-stable if ∀i ∈ [n],∀vi,∀v−i,
• ∀v′i ∈ equiv(vi), vi (M(vi, v−i)) = vi (M(v
′
i, v−i)), and
• M is (ǫ, α)-weakly-approximately-stable.
Note that when ǫ = 1 the definitions for both the relaxations (i.e., weak-approximate-stability and
approximate-stability) collapse to the one for α-stable algorithms. Also, throughout, we say that an
algorithm is ǫ-approximately-stable for α ≤ K if it is (ǫ, α)-approximately-stable for all α ∈ (0,K]
(similarly for ǫ-weakly-stable).
Although the definition of approximate-stability might be seem a bit contrived at first glance, it
is important to note that this is not the case. The requirement that the algorithm be stable on
equivalent instances is quite natural because of the following observation which states that with
respect to all the notions that we talk about in this paper any algorithm that satisfies such a notion
can always output the same allocation for two instances that are equivalent. The proof of this
statement appears in Appendix B.1.
Observation 3. Let P be a property that is one of EF1, EFX, PMMS, or PO. For all i ∈ [n], if an
allocation (A1, · · · , An) satisfies property P with respect to the profile (vi, v−i), then (A1, · · · , An)
also satisfies property P with respect to the profile (v′i, v−i), where v
′
i ∈ equiv(vi).
3 Related work
Now that we have defined our notion, we can better discuss related work. There are several lines
of research that are related to the topic of this paper. Some of the connections we discuss are in
very different contexts and are by themselves very active areas of research. In such cases we only
provide some pointers to the relevant literature, citing the seminal works in these areas.
Connections to algorithmic stability, differential privacy, and algorithmic fairness. Al-
gorithmic stability captures the idea of stability by employing the principle that the output of an
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algorithm should not “change much” when a “small change” is made to the input. To the best
of our knowledge, notions of stability have not been considered in the AGT literature. However,
the computational learning theory literature has considered various notions of stability and has,
for instance, used them to draw connections between the stability of a learning algorithm and its
ability to generalize (e.g., [BE02; SSSS10]). Although the notion of stability we employ here is
based on the same principle, it is defined differently from the ones in this literature. Here we are
concerned about the change in utility than an agent experiences when she perturbs her input and
deem an algorithm to be approximately-stable if this change is small.
Algorithmic stability can, in turn, be connected to differential privacy [DMNS06; Dwo06]. Infor-
mally, differential privacy (DP) requires that the probability of an outcome does not “change much”
on “small changes” to the input. Therefore, essentially, DP can be considered as a notion of algo-
rithmic stability, albeit a very strong one as compared to the ones studied in the learning theory
literature (see the discussion in [Dwo+15, Sec. 1.4]) and the one we consider. In particular, if we
were considering randomized algorithms, it is indeed the case that an ǫ-differentially private algo-
rithm is exp(ǫ)-stable, just like how an ǫ-differentially private algorithm is a (exp(ǫ)− 1)-dominant
strategy mechanism [MT07]. Nevertheless, we believe that the notion we introduce here is indepen-
dently useful, and is different from DP in a few ways. First, the motivation is completely different.
We believe that our notion may be important even in situations where privacy is not a concern.
Second, in this paper we are only concerned with deterministic algorithms and one can easily see
that DP is too strong a notion for this case as there are no deterministic and differentially private
algorithms that have a range of at least two.
Finally, the literature on algorithmic (individual-based) fairness captures the idea of fairness by
employing the principle that “similar agents” should be “treated similarly” [Dwo+12]. Although
this notion is employed in contexts where one is talking about two different individuals, note that
one way to think of our stability requirement is to think of it as a fairness requirement where two
agents are considered similar if and only if they have similar inputs (i.e., say, if one’s input is a
perturbation of the other’s). Therefore, thinking this way, algorithmic fairness can be considered as
a generalization of stability, and just like DP it is much stronger and only applicable in randomized
settings. In fact, algorithmic fairness can be seen as a generalization of DP (see the discussion in
[Dwo+12, Sec. 2.3]) and so our argument above as to why our notion is useful is relevant even in
this case.
Connections to robust algorithm and mechanism design. Informally, an algorithm is said
to be robust if it “performs-well” even under “slightly different” inputs or if the underlying model is
different from the one the designer has access to. This notion has received considerable amount of
attention in the algorithmic game theory and social choice literature. For instance—and although
this line of work does not explicitly term their algorithms as “(approximately) robust”—the flurry
of work that takes the implicit utilitarian view considers scenarios where the agents have underlying
cardinal preferences but only provide ordinal preferences to the designer. The goal of the designer in
these settings is to then use these ordinal preferences in order obtain an algorithm or mechanism that
“performs well” (in the approximation sense, with respect to some objective function) with respect
to all the possible underlying cardinal preferences (e.g., [Bou+15; AS16; AZ17; GKM17; AA18]).
Additionally, and more explicitly, robust algorithm design has been considered, for instance, in the
context of voting (e.g., [SYE13; Bre+17]) and the stable marriage problem [ML18; MV18; CSS19],
and robust mechanism design has been considered in the context of auctions [CMZ12; CMZ14;
CMZ15] and facility location [ML19]. Although, intuitively, the concepts of robustness and stability
might seem quite similar, it is important to note that they are different. Stability requires that the
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outcome of an algorithm does not “change much” if one of the agents slightly modifies its input.
Therefore, the emphasis here is to make sure that the outcomes are not very different as long as
there is a small change to the input associated with one of the agents. Robustness, on the other
hand, requires the outcome of an algorithm to remain “good” (in the approximation sense) even if
the underlying inputs are different from what the algorithm had access to. Therefore, in this case
the emphasis is on making sure that the same output (i.e., one that is computed with the input
the algorithm has access to) is not-too-bad with respect to a set of possible underlying true inputs
(but ones the algorithm does not have access to). More broadly, one can think of robustness as a
feature that a designer aspires to to ensure that the outcome of their algorithm is not-too-bad even
if the model assumed, or the input they have access to, is slightly inaccurate, whereas stability in
the context that we use here is more of a feature that is in service of unsophisticated agents who
are prone to making mistakes when converting their preferences to cardinal values.
Related work on fair division of indivisible goods. The problem of fairly allocating indi-
visible goods has received considerable attention, with several works proposing different notions of
fairness [LMMS04; Bud11; Car+16; ABM18] and computing allocations that satisfy these notions,
sometimes along with some efficiency requirements [Car+16; BKV18; PR18; CGH19]. This paper
also studies the problem of computing fair and efficient allocations, but in contrast to previous work
our focus is on coming up with algorithms that are also (approximately) stable. While many of
these papers address the general case of n ≥ 2 agents, our work focuses on the case of two agents.
Although a restricted case, the two agent case is an important one and has been explicitly considered
in several previous works [BKK12; Ram13; BKK14; VK14; Azi15; PR18]. Among these, the work
that is most relevant to our results here is that of Ramaekers [Ram13]. In particular, and although
the results here we derived independently, this paper contains two results that are similar to the
ones we have here—first, a slightly weaker version of the n = 2 case of Theorem 2, and second, a
slightly weaker version of Theorem 3. The exact differences are outlined in Sections 4.3 and 4.4
since we need to introduce a few more notions to make them clear.
In addition to the papers mentioned above—all of which adopt the model as in this paper where the
assumption is that the agents have cardinal preferences—there is also work that considers the case
when agents have ordinal preferences [BEL10; BKK14; AGMW15; SAH17]. Although this line of
work is related in that ordinal algorithms are stable, it is also quite different since usually the goal
in these papers is to compute fair allocations if they exist or study the complexity of computing
notions like possibly-fair or necessarily-fair allocations.
4 Approximate-stability in fair division of indivisible goods
Our aim is to design (approximately) stable algorithms for allocating a set of indivisible goods
among two agents that guarantee pairwise maximin share (PMMS) and Pareto optimal (PO) allo-
cations. However, before we try to design new algorithms, the first question that arises is “How do
the existing algorithms fare? How stable are they?” We address this below.
4.1 How (approximately) stable are the existing algorithms?
We consider the following well-studied algorithms that guarantee PO and at least EF1.
i) Adjusted winner protocol [BT96a; BT96b]; returns an EF1 and PO allocation for two agents.
ii) Leximin solution [PR18]; returns a PMMS and PO allocation for two agents.
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A B
g1 T-1 T-2
g2 1 2
(2a) Original instance
A B
g1 T-3 T-2
g2 3 2
(2b) Instance where agent A makes a mistake
iii) Maximum Nash Welfare solution [Car+16]; returns an EF1 and PO allocation for any number
of agents.
iv) Fisher-market based algorithm [BKV18]; returns an EF1 and PO allocation for any number
of agents.
All the algorithms mentioned above perform poorly even in terms of the weaker relaxation of
stability, i.e., weak-approximate-stability. To see this, consider the instance in Table 2a, and note
that the allocation that is output by any of these algorithms is agent A getting g1 and agent B
getting g2. Next, consider the instance in Table 2b. In this case, if we use any of these algorithms,
then the allocation that is output is agent A getting g2 and agent B getting g1.
Given this, let the values mentioned in Table 2a constitute the true valuation function (v1) of agent
A. When reporting these, she receives the good g1. Table 2b shows agent A’s misreport (v
′
1) in
which case she receives the good g2. Recall from the definition of α-neighbours of vi (Definition 5)
that v′1 ∈ α-N(vi), where α = 4. Therefore, we now have,
v1(g2)
v1(g1)
= 1
T−1 , or in other words, all the
four algorithms mentioned above are (T − 1)-weakly-approximately-stable, even when α = 4.
Remark: We can think of a question that a skeptical reader might have at this point. Here we
try to preemptively address this. Seeing the instances and associated outcomes, one might wonder
“is the outcome ({g2}, {g1}) w.r.t. the valuations in Table 2b really that bad? After all, this is
indeed the outcome one would expect if social welfare is a concern (and the issue becomes more
pronounced if we replace the 2 in Table 2b with, say, a 20).” Our response to this is, recall that the
setting under consideration is one where there is no money involved. Therefore, we believe that
social welfare, or for that matter any measure which involves interpersonal comparison of utilities,
is not a particularly good objective to be concerned about in such settings since the way agents
map their preferences to numerical values can be imprecise.
4.2 Are there fair and efficient algorithms that are stable?
The observation that previously studied algorithms perform poorly even in terms of the weaker
relaxation of stability implies that we need to look for new algorithms. So, now, a natural question
that arises here is: “Is there any hope at all for algorithms that are fair, PO, and stable?” Note
that without the requirement of PO the answer to this question is a “Yes”—at least when the
fairness notion that is being considered is EF1, since it is easy to observe that the well-known draft
algorithm (where agents take turns picking their favourite good among the remaining goods) that
is EF1 [Car+16, Sec. 3] is stable. However, if we require PO, then we show that the answer to the
question above is a “No,” in that there are no stable algorithms that always return an EF1 and
even approximately-PO allocation.
Theorem 1. Let M be an algorithm that is stable and always returns an EF1 allocation. Then,
for any β in [1, T−32 ], M cannot be β-PO.
Proof: Consider the instance in Table 3a which represents agents’ true valuation functions. For
simplicity we assume that T mod 9 ≡ 0. Next, since the agents are symmetric, and one can easily
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A B
g1
T
3
T
3
g2
2T
9
2T
9
g3
2T
9
2T
9
g4
2T
9
2T
9
(3a) Original instance
A B
g1
T
3 T − 3
g2
2T
9 1
g3
2T
9 1
g4
2T
9 1
(3b) Instance where agent B makes a mistake
verify that in every EF1 allocation each of the agents have to get exactly two goods, let us assume
w.l.o.g. that agent A receives g1. Given this, now consider the instance in Table 3b where agent
B makes a mistake. Let us denote agent B’s true utility function as v, misreport as v′ ∈ 4T3 -N(v),
and (S1, S2) and (S
′
1, S
′
2) as outcomes for the instances in Tables 3a, 3b, respectively. From our
discussion above, we know that v(S2) =
4T
9 , since agent B gets two goods from the set {g2, g3, g4}.
Since M is stable, we know that v(S2) = v(S
′
2). Now, it is easy to see that this is only possible
if the set S′2 has exactly two goods from {g2, g3, g4}. So, let us assume w.l.o.g. that S
′
2 = {g2, g3}.
If this is the case, then note that the allocation ({g2, g3, g4}, {g1}) Pareto dominates the allocation
(S′1, S
′
2) by a factor of
v′(g1)
v′(S′
2
)
= T−32 , which in turn proves our theorem. 
Given this result and our observation in Section 4.1 that previously studied algorithms perform
poorly even in terms of weak-approximate-stability, it is clear that the best one can hope for is to
design new algorithms that are fair, efficient, and approximately-stable. In Section 4.4 we show
that this is possible. However, before we do that, in the next section we first present a necessary
and sufficient condition for PMMS allocations when there are n ≥ 2 agents.
4.3 A necessary and sufficient condition for existence of PMMS allocations
The general characterization result for PMMS allocations presented here will be useful in the next
section to design an approximately-stable algorithm that produces a PMMS and PO allocation
for the case of two agents. Additionally, we also believe that the result might potentially be of
independent interest.
For an agent ℓ ∈ [n], a set Q ⊆ G, and a set S ⊆ Q, the result uses a notion of rank of S, denoted
by rQℓ (S), and defined as the number of subsets of Q that have value at most vi(S). More formally,
r
Q
ℓ (S) =
∣∣{P | P ⊆ Q, vℓ(P ) ≤ vℓ(S)}∣∣. (3)
Although we were not initially aware of the use of rank in the fair division literature, it turns out
that it has been considered previously. Ramaekers [Ram13] considered it (in particular, according
to our notation, they talk about rGℓ (S)) in the context of fair division among two agents who have
a strict preference orders over the subsets of G, and one of their results is a slightly weaker (since
they assume a strict order over subsets of G which is not assumed in this paper) version of the
n = 2 case of the theorem below [Ram13, Thm. 1(2)].
Theorem 2. Given an instance with m indivisible goods and n ≥ 2 agents with additive valuation
functions, an allocation A = (A1, · · · , An) is a pairwise maximin share allocation if and only if
∀i ∈ [n],∀j ∈ [n], and Kij = Ai ∪Aj ,
min
{
r
Kij
i (Ai), r
Kij
j (Aj)
}
≥ 2|Kij |−1.
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Before we present a formal argument to prove this theorem, we present a brief overview. Overall,
the proof uses some observations about the ranking function. In particular, for a set Q and S ⊆ Q,
one key observation is that the rank of S is high enough (more precisely, greater than 2|Q|−1) if and
only if the value of this set is at least half that of Q. Once we have this, then the proof essentially
follows by combining it with a few other observations about the ranking function and some simple
counting arguments.
More formally, we start by making the following claims about the ranking function. The proofs of
these claims appear in Appendix B.2.
Claim 1. Let Q ⊆ G and i ∈ [n] be some agent. Then,
i) for A ⊆ Q,B ⊆ Q, vi(A) < vi(B)⇔ r
Q
i (A) < r
Q
i (B)
ii) rQi (A) < r
Q
i (B)⇔ r
G
i (A) < r
G
i (B).
Claim 2. Let Q ⊆ G, i ∈ [n] be some agent, ℓ ∈ Z≥0, and Tℓ = {P | P ⊆ Q, r
Q
i (P ) ≤ ℓ}. Then,
i) for S ⊆ Q, if rQi (S) = ℓ, then |Tℓ| = ℓ
ii) |Tℓ| ≤ ℓ.
Claim 3. Let A = (A1, · · · , An) be an allocation, and i, j ∈ [n] be some agents. If Kij = Ai ∪Aj ,
then
r
Kij
i (Ai) > 2
|Kij |−1 ⇔ vi(Ai) ≥
vi(Kij)
2
.
Equipped with the claims above, we are now ready to prove our theorem.
Proof of Theorem 2: (⇒) Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that A is a PMMS alloca-
tion and that there exists i, j such that min{r
Kij
i (Ai), r
Kij
j (Aj)} < 2
|Kij |−1. W.l.o.g., let us assume
that r
Kij
i (Ai) < 2
|Kij |−1. Next, consider the set H = {B | B ⊆ Kij , r
Kij
i (B) > r
Kij
i (Ai)}. Since
r
Kij
i (Ai) < 2
|Kij |−1, we know from Claim 2(ii) that |H| > 2|Kij |−1 (since there are 2|Kij | subsets of
Kij). This implies that there is a set S and its complement S
c = Kij \ S such that, r
Kij
i (Ai) <
min{r
Kij
i (S), r
Kij
i (S
c)}, which in turn using Claim 1(i) implies that vi(Ai) < min{vi(S), vi(S
c)}.
However, note that this contradicts the fact that i has an MMS partition w.r.t. j in A.
(⇐) Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists an agent i such that i does not
have an MMS partition w.r.t. j, but min{r
Kij
i (Ai), r
Kij
j (Aj)} ≥ 2
|Kij |−1. This implies that vi(Ai) <
vi(Kij)
2 , which in turn using Claim 3 and the fact that min{r
Kij
i (Ai), r
Kij
j (Aj)} ≥ 2
|Kij |−1, implies
that r
Kij
i (Ai) = 2
|Kij |−1. Next, since i does not perceive (Ai, Aj) to be an MMS partition w.r.t.
j, there must exist a partition (A′i, A
′
j) such that A
′
i ∪A
′
j = Kij and min{vi(A
′
i), vi(A
′
j)} > vi(Ai).
This implies that, using Claim 1(i), we have that r
Kij
i (A
′
i) > r
Kij
i (Ai) and r
Kij
i (A
′
j) > r
Kij
i (Ai),
or in other words that a set (i.e., A′i) and its complement (i.e., A
′
j = Kij \ A
′
i) both have rank
greater than r
Kij
i (Ai). Now, if this is case, then one can see that, since r
Kij
i (Ai) = 2
|Kij |−1, this
implies there exists a set S ⊆ Kij and its complement S
c = Kij \ S such that r
Kij
i (S) ≤ r
Kij
i (Ai)
and r
Kij
i (S
c) ≤ r
Kij
i (Ai). However, this is impossible because we can now use Claim 3 to see that
both vi(S) and vi(S
c) have value less than
vi(Kij)
2 , which in turn contradicts the fact that vi is an
additive valuation function. 
12
In the next section we use this result to show an approximately-stable algorithm that is PMMS
and PO when there are two agents.
4.4 rank-leximin: An approximately-stable PMMS and PO algorithm for two
agents
The idea of our algorithm is simple. Instead of the well-known Leximin algorithm where one aims
to maximize the minimum utility any agents gets, then the second minimum utility, and so on,
our approach, which we refer to as the rank-leximin algorithm (Algorithm 1), is to do a leximin-
like allocation, but based on the ranks of the bundles that the agents receive. Here for an agent
i and a bundle B ⊆ G, by rank we mean rGi (B), as defined in (3). That is, the rank-leximin
algorithm maximizes the minimum rank of the bundle that any agent gets, then it maximizes the
second minimum rank, then the third minimum rank, and so on. Note that this in turn induces a
comparison operator ≺ between two partitions and this is formally specified as rank-leximinCMP
in Algorithm 1. Although the original leximin solution also returns a PMMS and PO allocation for
two agents, recall that we observed in Section 4.1 that it does not provide any guarantee even in
terms of weak-approximate-stability, even when α = 4. Rank-leximin on the other hand is PMMS
and PO for two agents and, as we will show, is also (2+ 12α
T
)-approximately-stable for all α ∈ (0, T3 ].
Additionally, it also returns an allocation that is PMMS and PO for any number of agents as long
as they report ordinally equivalent valuation functions (see Definition 9).
Remark: Given the characterization result for PMMS allocations, one can come up with several
algorithms that satisfy PMMS and PO. However, we consider rank-leximin here since it is a natural
counterpart to the well-known leximin algorithm [PR18]. Additionally, it turns out that contrary to
our initial belief the idea of rank-leximin is not new. Ramaekers [Ram13] considered it in the context
of algorithms for two-agent fair division that satisfy Pareto-optimality, anonymity, the unanimity
bound, and preference monotonicity (see [Ram13, Sec. 3] for definitions), where the unanimity bound
is a notion that one can show is equivalent to the notion of Maximin share (MMS) that is used in
the computational fair division literature. So, with caveat that Ramaekers [Ram13] assumes that
the agents have a strict preference orders over the subsets of G (which is not assumed in this paper),
the result of Ramaekers [Ram13, Thm. 2] already proves that rank-leximin is PMMS and PO for
two agents (MMS is equivalent to PMMS in the case of two agents), which is the result we show in
Theorem 3. However, we still include our proof because of the indifference issue mentioned above,
and since it almost follows directly from Theorem 2.
Below we first show that the rank-leximin algorithm always returns an allocation that is PMMS and
PO for the case of two agents. The fact that it is PO can be seen by using some of the properties
that we proved about the ranking function in the previous section, while the other property follows
from combining Theorem 2 along with a simple pigeonhole argument. Following this, we also show
that rank-leximin always returns a PMMS and PO allocation when there are n ≥ 2 agents with
ordinally equivalent valuation functions. The proof of this is slightly more involved and it proceeds
by first showing how rank-leximin returns such an allocation when all the agents are identical.
Once we have this, then the theorem follows by repeated application of Observation 3. However,
since this result is not directly related to the core focus of this paper, the proof is deferred to
Appendix B.3.
Theorem 3. Given an instance with m indivisible goods and two agents with additive valuation
functions, the rank-leximin algorithm (Algorithm 1) returns an allocation that is PMMS and PO.
Proof: Let A = (A1, · · · , An) be the allocation that is returned by the rank-leximin algorithm
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Procedure: rank-leximinCMP(P, T )
Input: two partitions P, T ∈ Πn(G)
Output: returns true if P ≺ T , i.e., if P is before T in the rank-leximin sorted order
1: RP ← agents sorted in non-decreasing order of the rank of their bundles in P , i.e., based on r
G
i (Pi),
with ties broken in some arbitrary but consistent way throughout
2: RT ← similar ordering as in RP above, but based on r
G
i (Ti)
3: for each ℓ ∈ [n] do
4: i← RℓP ⊲ ℓ-th agent in RP
5: j ← RℓT ⊲ ℓ-th agent in RT
6: if rGi (Pi) 6= r
G
j (Tj) then
7: return rGi (Pi) < r
G
j (Tj)
8: end if
9: end for
10: return false
Main:
Input: for each agent i ∈ [n], their valuation function vi : 2
G → R≥0
Output: an allocation A = (A1, · · · , An) that is PMMS and PO
11: L ← perform a rank-Lexmin sort on Πn(G) based on the rank-leximinCMP operator defined above
12: return A = (A1, · · · , An) that is the last element in L
Algorithm 1: rank-leximin algorithm
(Algorithm 1). Below we will first show that A is PO and subsequently argue why it is PMMS.
Suppose A is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists another allocation A′ such that for all i ∈ [n],
vi(A
′
i) ≥ vi(Ai), and the inequality is strict for at least one of the agents, say j. This in turn implies
that using Claim 1 we have that for all i ∈ [n], rGi (A
′
i) ≥ r
G
i (Ai) and r
G
j (A
′
j) > r
G
j (Aj). However,
this implies that from the procedure rank-leximinCMP in Algorithm 1 we have that A ≺ A′, and
this in turn directly contradicts the fact that A was the allocation that was returned.
To show that A is PMMS, consider agent 1 and all the sets S such that rG1 (S) ≥ 2
m−1. From
Claim 2 we know that there are at least 2m−1 + 1 such sets. Therefore, if Sc = G \ S, then
there is at least one S such that rG2 (S
c) ≥ 2m−1. This implies (S, Sc) is an allocation such that
min{rG1 (S), r
G
2 (S
c)} ≥ 2m−1. Now since rank-leximin maximizes the minimum rank that any agent
receives, we have that min{rG1 (A1), r
G
2 (A2)} ≥ 2
m−1, and so now we can use Theorem 2 to see that
A is a PMMS allocation. 
Theorem 4. Given an instance with m indivisible goods and n ≥ 2 agents with additive valuation
functions, the rank-leximin algorithm (Algorithm 1) returns an allocation A that is PMMS and PO
if all the agents report ordinally equivalent valuation functions.
Now that we know rank-leximin produces a PMMS and PO allocation, we will move on to see
how approximately-stable it is in the next section. However, before that we make the following
observation.
Remark: The rank-leximin algorithm takes exponential time. Note that this is not surprising
since finding PMMS allocations is NP-hard even for two identical agents—one can see this by a
straightforward reduction from the well-known Partition problem.
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4.4.1 rank-leximin is
(
2 +O(α
T
)
)
-approximately-stable for α ≤ T3
Before we show how approximately-stable rank-leximin is, we state the following claims which will
be useful in order to prove our result. The proofs of these claims appear in Appendix B.4.
Claim 4. Let v be an additive utility function and for some α > 0, let v′ ∈ α-N(v). Then, for any
S1, S2 ⊆ G,
i) |v(S1)− v
′(S1)| ≤
α
2
ii) if v(S1) > v(S2) and v
′(S1) ≤ v
′(S2), then v(S1)− v(S2) ≤ α.
Claim 5. Given an instance with m indivisible goods and two agents with additive valuation func-
tions, let (A1, A2) be a PMMS allocation. If for an agent i ∈ [2], k = |Aj | ≥ 2, where j 6= i,
then
i) vi(Ai) ≥ vi(M
j
i ), where M
j
i is the maximum valued good of agent i in the bundle Aj
ii) vi(Aj)− vi(Ai) ≤ vi(m
j
i ), where m
j
i is the minimum valued good of agent i in the bundle Aj
iii) vi(Ai) ≥
k−1
2k−1T .
Claim 6. Given an instance with m indivisible goods and two agents with additive valuation func-
tions, let (A1, A2) be the allocation that is returned by the rank-leximin algorithm for this instance.
If k1 = r
G
1 (A1) and k2 = r
G
2 (A2), then min{k1, k2} ≥ 2
m−1 and max{k1, k2} > 2
m−1.
Equipped with the claims above, we can now prove the approximate-stability bound for rank-
leximin. The proof here proceeds by first arguing about how rank-leximin is stable with respect
to equivalent instances. This is followed by showing upper and lower bounds on how weakly-
approximately-stable it is, which in turn involves looking at several different cases and using several
properties (some of them proved above and some that we will introduce as we go along) about the
allocation returned by the rank-leximin algorithm.
Theorem 5. Given an instance with m indivisible goods and two agents with additive valuation
functions, the rank-leximin algorithm is (2 + 12α
T
)-approximately-stable for all α ≤ T3 .
Proof: Let us consider two agents with valuation functions v1, v2. Note that w.l.o.g. we can
assume that agent 1 is the one that is making a mistake. Throughout, for some α > 0, let us
denote this misreport by v′1. Also, let rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2), and rank-leximin(v
′
1, v2) =
(S1, S2). Next, let us introduce the following notation that we will use throughout. For some
arbitrary valuation functions y1, y2, if an allocation (C1, C2) precedes an allocation (B1, B2) in
the rank-leximin order with respect to (y1, y2) (i.e., according to the rank-leximinCMP function
in Algorithm 1), then we denote this by (B1, B2) ≻y1,y2 (C1, C2). In the case they are equivalent
according to the rank-leximin operator, then we denote it by (B1, B2) ≡y1,y2 (C1, C2). Additionally,
we use (B1, B2) y1,y2 (C1, C2) to denote that (C1, C2) either precedes or is equivalent to (B1, B2).
Equipped with the notations above, let us now prove our theorem. To do this, first recall from
the definition of approximate-stability (see Definition 10) that in order to prove our theorem,
we first need to show that if v′1 ∈ equiv(v1), then v1(A1) = v1(S1). To see why this is true,
consider the rank-leximinCMP function in Algorithm 1 and observe that since v′1 ∈ equiv(v1),
v1, v
′
1 have the same bundle rankings, and hence for any two partitions P, T ∈ πn(G), P ≺v1,v2 T
(i.e., P appears before T in the rank-leximin order) if and only if P ≺v′
1
,v2 T . This in turn
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along with the fact that rank-leximin uses a deterministic tie-breaking rule implies that rank-
leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2) = rank-leximin(v
′
1, v2), thus showing that it is stable with respect to
equivalent instances.
Having shown the above, let us move to the second part where we show how weakly-approxmiately-
stable rank-leximin is. For the rest of this proof, let v′1 ∈ α-N(vi), for some α ∈ (0,
T
3 ]. Also, for
i ∈ [2], let the ranking function associated with valuation functions vi and v
′
1 be r
G
i (·) and r
′G
1 (·),
respectively. Throughout, in order to keep the notations simple, we use r1(·), r
′
1(·), and r2(·) to
refer to rG1 (·), r
′G
1 (·), and r
G
2 (·), respectively.
In order to prove the bound on weak-approximate-stability, we show two lemmas. The first one
shows an upper bound of 2 for the ratio v1(S1)
v1(A1)
and the second one shows a lower bound of 1
2+ 12α
T
.
Since both the proofs involve a lot of case-by-case analysis, we only present a brief sketch here and
defer the complete proofs to Appendices B.4.1 and B.4.2.
Lemma 6. For α > 0, if v′1 ∈ α-N(v1), rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2), and rank-leximin(v
′
1, v2) =
(S1, S2), then
v1(S1)
v1(A1)
≤ 2.
Proof (sketch): We proceed by considering three cases. Note that since rank-leximin returns a
PMMS allocation (Theorem 3) we know from Theorem 2 that these are the only cases. Also, below
we directly consider the case when v1(S1) > v1(A1), since otherwise the bound trivially holds.
Case 1. r1(A1) > 2
m−1: In this case the bound follows by using Claim 3.
Case 2. r1(A1) = 2
m−1 and |S1| = 1: In this case we proceed by first observing that since |S1| = 1
and v1(A1) < v1(S1), we have that S1 ⊆ A2. This in turn implies v1(S1) ≤ v1(A2), and so we
have that v1(S1)
v1(A1)
≤ v1(A2)
v1(A1)
. Now, in order to upper-bound this, we further consider two cases. The
first is when |A2| ≥ 2, and here the required bound follows by using Claim 5 from which we know
that v1(A1) ≥
k−1
2k−1T . The second case is when |A2| = 1, and here, since S1 ⊆ A2, we have that
S1 = A2. This implies rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2) and rank-leximin(v
′
1, v2) = (A2, A1). Given
this, one can make a series of observations to conclude that (A1, A2) ≡v1,v2 (A2, A1) and (A1, A2)
≡v′
1
,v2 (A2, A1). However, this is a contradiction because rank-leximin breaks ties deterministically.
Case 3. r1(A1) = 2
m−1 and |S1| ≥ 2: Using the facts that v1(S1) > v1(A1), r1(A1) = 2
m−1, and
rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2), it is not hard to see that for all g ∈ S1, v1(S1 \{g}) ≤ v1(A1). This
observation in turn can be used to show that v1(S1)
v1(A1)
≤ |S1||S1|−1 ≤ 2.
Finally, combining all the three cases above gives us our lemma. As mentioned previously, the
complete proof appears in Appendix B.4.1. 
Next, we show a lower bound for v1(S1)
v1(A1)
.
Lemma 7. For α ∈ (0, T3 ], if v
′
1 ∈ α-N(v1), rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2), and rank-leximin(v
′
1,
v2) = (S1, S2), then
v1(S1)
v1(A1)
≥
1
2 + 12α
T
.
Proof (sketch): Since we are trying to show a lower bound for v1(S1)
v1(A1)
, below we consider the case
when v1(A1) > v1(S1), since otherwise it is trivially lower-bounded by 1. Also, note we can directly
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consider the case when v1(S2) > v1(S1), for otherwise v1(S1) = T − v1(S2) ≥
T
2 and so
v1(S1)
v1(A1)
≥ 12 .
Next, we proceed by considering the following cases. Note that these are the only three cases using
Claim 6 with respect to the allocation (S1, S2).
Case 1. r′1(S1) > 2
m−1: Since r′1(S1) > 2
m−1, we know from Claim 3 that v′1(S1) ≥
T
2 . Also, since
‖v1 − v
′
1‖1 ≤ α and v1(G) = v
′
1(G) = T , v
′
1(S1)− v1(S1) ≤
α
2 . Combining these gives us our bound.
Case 2. r′1(S1) = 2
m−1 and min{r1(A1), r2(A2)} = r1(A1): Since min{r1(A1), r2(A2)} = r1(A1)
and rank-leximin(v′1, v2) = (S1, S2), we have that v
′
1(A1) ≤ v
′
1(S1), for if not, then it is easy to
see that (A1, A2) ≻(v′
1
,v2) (S1, S2), which is a contradiction. Also, since v1(A1) > v1(S1) and
v′1(A1) ≤ v
′
1(S1), from Claim 4(ii) we have that v1(A1) − v1(S1) ≤ α. Given these, one can show
our bound by considering two cases. The first is when |S2| = 1, and here we can obtain our
bound by observing that S2 ⊆ A1 and by using the fact that v1(A1) > v1(S2). The second case is
when |S2| ≥ 2, and here the bound follows by combining the fact v1(A1) − v1(S1) ≤ α along with
Claims 4(i) and 5(iii).
Case 3. r′1(S1) = 2
m−1 and min{r1(A1), r2(A2)} = r2(A2): Here we proceed by considering three
sub-cases. The first one is when |S2| ≥ 2 and |S1 ∩A1| = 0, and here one can obtain the bound by
combining Claim 5(iii) along with the observation that since |S1 ∩ A1| = 0, A1 ⊆ S2. The second
case is when |S2| = 1, and here we argue that this can be handled by proceeding as in Case 2
above. The last one is when |S2| ≥ 2 and |S1 ∩ A1| ≥ 1. In this case the proof proceeds by first
making the observation that ∀g ∈ G, r1(A1 \ {g}) ≤ 2
m−1. This in turn can be used to show that
v1(A1) ≤ 2v1(S1) + α, which can then be combined with Claim 4(ii) to show the bound.
Finally, combining all the cases above gives us our lemma. As mentioned previously, the complete
proof appears in Appendix B.4.2. 
Since rank-leximin is stable with respect to equivalent instances, and combining the lemmas above
we have that it is (2 + 12α
T
)-weakly-approximately-stable for all α ≤ T3 , our theorem follows. 
Note that for α ∈ (0, T3 ], our approximate-stability bound is independent of the choice of T ,
whereas for all the previously studied algorithms that we had considered in Section 4.1 it was
dependent on T , and in fact was equal to (T − 1) even when α = 4. Additionally, none of those
algorithms are stable on equivalent instances either (i.e., the bound of (T − 1) was with respect
to weak-approximate-stability and not the stronger notion of approximate-stability). Finally, it
is interesting to note that although our model assumes that the misreport v′ always maintains
the ordinal information (over the singletons) of the true valuation v (see the second condition in
Definition 5), the proof above does not use this fact. This implies that rank-leximin is stronger than
what the theorem indicates since it is (2 + 12α
T
)-stable for all α ≤ T3 and for all possible misreports
that are within an L1 distance of α from the original valuation.
6
6Seeing this, one might wonder “why have the condition of maintaining the ordinal information over the singletons
(i.e., the second condition in Definition 5) then?” The reason is, recall that our original goal was look for stable
algorithms, and so this condition was a natural one to impose since, as mentioned in the introduction, one cannot
hope for stable algorithms without assuming anything about the kind of mistakes the agents might commit. However,
as mentioned in Section 4.2, even with this assumption designing stable algorithms turned out to be impossible, and
hence we relaxed the strong requirement of stability to approximate-stability. And under this relaxed definition, the
condition turns out to be not as crucial.
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Input: for each agent i ∈ [2], their valuation function vi
Output: an allocation A = (A1, A2) that satisfies the same properties as M
1: if agent 1 has a good g such that vi(g) >
T
2
then
2: return A = ({g},G \ {g}) ⊲ Phase 1
3: end if
4: return M(v1, v2). ⊲ Phase 2
Algorithm 2: Framework for modified-M
5 Weak-approximate-stability in fair division of indivisible goods
In this section we consider the weaker notion of approximate stability (i.e., weak-approximate-
stability) as defined in Definition 8 and we show how a very simple change to the existing algo-
rithms can ensure more stability. In particular, we show that any algorithm that returns a PMMS
allocation for two agents can be made (4 + 6α
T
)-weakly-approximately-stable for α ≤ T3 (one can
show similar but slightly worse bounds for any algorithm that only satisfies a weaker notion like
EF1/EFX). The main idea to achieve this is to modify the algorithm that produces a PMMS al-
location and convert it into a two-phase procedure where the first phase only handles instances
where agent 1 has a good of value greater than T2 . In the case of such instances, we just output the
allocation where agent 1 gets the highly-valued good and all the other goods are given to agent 2.
Below, in Algorithm 2, we formally describe the framework and subsequently show how this minor
change leads to better stability overall.
Theorem 8. Given an instance with m indivisible goods and two agents with additive valuation
functions, let M be an algorithm that always returns a PMMS allocation. Then, for α ≤ T3 ,
modified-M, which refers to the change as described in Algorithm 2, is (4+6α
T
)-weakly-approximately-
stable.
Proof (sketch): We begin by arguing that if M produces a PMMS allocation then so does
modified-M. To see this, note that we just need to show that the allocation A = ({g},G \ {g}) is
PMMS in the case when agent 1 has a good g of value greater than T2 (since if this is not the case
then modified-M returns the same outcome as M), and this fact in turn is easy to see because
agent 1 is envy-free and agent 2 gets m− 1 goods.
Given that modified-M is guaranteed to produce a PMMS allocation, it just remains to show the
bound on weak-approximate-stability. Note that the algorithm here is not symmetric, and hence
we need to consider what happens when each agent misreports. However, except for this, the
proof of this theorem has a similar flavour to that of Theorem 5, in that this too involves a lot of
case-by-case analysis. Therefore, in the interest of readability, we defer it to Appendix B.4.3. 
Note that the simple framework presented in Algorithm 2 works w.r.t. any algorithm M that is
fair, and so one can derive, perhaps better bounds, when considering modified versions of specific
algorithms (likes the ones in Section 4.1) that provide a PMMS, EFX, or EF1 guarantee. Addi-
tionally, it is useful to note that the result above continues to hold even when we consider PO
along with fairness since the allocation that is returned in Phase 1 is also PO (this can be seen by
observing that in the allocation that is returned in Phase 1, agent 1 has only one good with value
greater than T2 and so cannot be made better-off without making agent 2 worse-off). Therefore,
although the overall change that is required to any algorithm is minor, the observation is important
if we care about having stabler algorithms, since without this recall that we observed in Section 4.1
that all the four previously studied algorithms are (T − 1)-weakly-approximately-stable even when
18
α = 4.
6 Discussion
The problem addressed in this paper was born as a result of an example we came across on the
fair division website, Spliddit [GP15], where it seemed like arguably innocuous mistakes by an
agent had significant ramifications on their utility for the outcome. Thus, the question arose as to
whether such consequences were avoidable, or more broadly if we could have stabler algorithms in
the context of fair allocations. In this paper we focused on algorithmic stability in fair and efficient
allocation of indivisible goods among two agents, and towards this end, we introduced a notion of
stability and showed how it is impossible to achieve exact stability along with even a weak notion
of fairness like EF1 and even approximate efficiency. This raised the question of how to relax
the strong requirement of stability, and here we proposed two relaxations, namely, approximate-
stability and weak-approximate-stability, and showed how the previously studied algorithms in fair
division that are fair and efficient perform poorly with respect to these relaxations. This lead to
looking for new algorithms, and here we proposed an approximately-stable algorithm (rank-leximin)
that guarantees a pairwise maximin share and Pareto optimal allocation, and presented a simple
general framework for any fair algorithm to achieve weak-approximate stability. Along the way, we
also provided a characterization result for pairwise maximin share allocations and showed how (in
addition to the two-agent case) such allocations always exist as long as the agents report ordinally
equivalent valuation functions. Overall, while the results demonstrate how one can do better in the
context of two-agent fair allocations, we believe that our main contribution is in introducing the
notion of stability and its relaxations, and in explicitly advocating for it to be used in the design
of algorithms or mechanisms that elicit cardinal preferences.
Moving forward, we believe that there is a lot of scope for future work. Especially when given
the observation that humans may often find it hard to attribute exact numerical values to their
preferences, we believe that some notion of stability should be considered when designing algorithms
or mechanisms in settings where cardinal values are elicited. This opens up the possibility of asking
similar questions like the ones we have in other settings where such issues may perhaps be more
crucial. Additionally, specific to the problem considered in this paper, there are several unanswered
questions. For instance, the most obvious one is about the case when there are more than two agents.
A careful reader would have noticed that all the algorithms we talked about in this work heavily
relied on the fact that there were only two agents, and therefore none of them work when there are
more. As another example—this one in the context of two-agent fair allocations—one question that
could be interesting is to see if there are polynomial-time algorithms that are approximately-stable
and can guarantee EF1/EFX and PO. Given the fact that polynomial time EF1 and PO algorithms
exist for two agents, we believe that it would interesting to see if we can also additionally guarantee
approximate-stability, or prove otherwise—in which case it would demonstrate a clear separation
between unstable and approximately-stable algorithms. The rank-leximin algorithm presented here
is approximately-stable and provides the stated guarantees in terms of fairness and efficiency, but it
is exponential, and we could not answer this question either in the positive or otherwise. Therefore,
this, too, remains to be resolved by future work.
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A Additional discussion
A.1 Why the assumption of positive values for the goods?
To see why we make this assumption, consider the fair division instance in Table 4a. Next, consider
an arbitrary algorithm M that is EF1 and PO, and let us assume w.l.o.g. that the allocation
returned by the algorithm is ({g2}, {g1}). Now, let us consider the instance in Table 4b. Note
that since M returns an allocation that is PO and EF1, therefore the output with respect to the
instance in Table 4b has to be either ({g1}, {g2}) or (∅, {g1, g2}).
A B
g1 T-1 T-1
g2 1 1
(4a) Original instance
A B
g1 T T-1
g2 0 1
(4b) Instance where agent A makes a mistake
Given this, consider a scenario where the valuation function mentioned in Table 4a is the true
valuation (v1) of agent A. When reporting correctly, she receives the good g2. Table 4b shows
agent A’s misreport (v′1), where α = 2 and in which case she receives the good g1 or none of the
goods. Therefore, now, for any algorithm that is EF1 and PO, we either have v1(g1)
v1(g2)
= T1 , or
v1(∅)
v1(g2)
= 0, and both of these are not informative or useful.
B Omitted proofs
B.1 Omitted proofs from Section 2
Observation 1. An algorithm M is stable if and only if there exists an α > 0 such that M is
α-stable.
Proof: The forward part (i.e., the ‘if’ part) is obvious since by definition an algorithm is stable if
it is α-stable for all α > 0. To see the ‘only if’ part, let us assume that M is α-stable for some
α > 0. Next, for an arbitrary α′ 6= α, let us consider an arbitrary agent i1 ∈ [n], an arbitrary vi1 ,
an arbitrary v′i1 ∈ α
′-N(vi1), and arbitrary reports of the other agents denoted by v−i1 .
First, note that for any α′ < α, we have that
v′i1 ∈ α
′-N(vi1)⇒ v
′
i1
∈ α-N(vi1),
which in turn implies that M is α′-stable since it is α-stable.
Next, let us consider an α′ > α. Now, in this case observe that we can construct a (finite) series
of valuations functions vi2 , · · · , vin , where for all j ∈ [n], vij+1 ∈ α-N(vij ) and where vin+1 = v
′
i1
.
This along with the fact that M is α-stable implies that, for all j ∈ [n],
vi1(M(vij , v−i1)) = vi1(M(vij+1 , v−i1)).
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So, using the equalities above, we have,
vi1(M(vi1 , v−i1)) = vi1(M(vin+1 , v−i1)) = vi1(M(v
′
i1
, v−i1)),
thus proving that M is α′-stable. 
Observation 3. Let P be a property that is one of EF1, EFX, PMMS, or PO. For all i ∈ [n], if an
allocation (A1, · · · , An) satisfies property P with respect to the profile (vi, v−i), then (A1, · · · , An)
also satisfies property P with respect to the profile (v′i, v−i), where v
′
i ∈ equiv(vi).
Proof: Let us consider an arbitrary agent i ∈ [n]. Now, recall from Definition 9 that for any
v′i ∈ equiv(vi), and for any two sets S1, S2 ⊆ G, v
′
i(S1) ≥ v
′
i(S2) if and only vi(S1) ≥ vi(S2). Given
this, the observation trivially follows by using the definitions of the stated properties. 
B.2 Omitted proofs from Section 4.3
Claim 1. Let Q ⊆ G and i ∈ [n] be some agent. Then,
i) for A ⊆ Q,B ⊆ Q, vi(A) < vi(B)⇔ r
Q
i (A) < r
Q
i (B)
ii) rQi (A) < r
Q
i (B)⇔ r
G
i (A) < r
G
i (B).
Proof: To prove the first part, consider the sets HA = {P | P ⊆ Q, vi(P ) ≤ vi(A)} and HB = {P |
P ⊆ Q, vi(P ) ≤ vi(B)}. First, observe that vi(A) < vi(B) if and only if |HA| < |HB |. Also, from
the definition of the ranking function we know that |HA| < |HB | if and only if r
Q
i (A) < r
Q
i (B).
Combining these we have our claim.
To prove the second part, observe that from the first part we know that rQi (A) < r
Q
i (B) if and only
if vi(A) < vi(B). Next, again using the first part with Q = G, we have that vi(A) < vi(B) if and
only if rGi (A) < r
G
i (B). Combining these we have our claim. 
Claim 2. Let Q ⊆ G, i ∈ [n] be some agent, ℓ ∈ Z≥0, and Tℓ = {P | P ⊆ Q, r
Q
i (P ) ≤ ℓ}. Then,
i) for S ⊆ Q, if rQi (S) = ℓ, then |Tℓ| = ℓ
ii) |Tℓ| ≤ ℓ.
Proof: To prove the first part, consider the set H = {P | P ⊆ Q, vi(P ) ≤ vi(S)}. First, note that
from Claim 1(i) we can see that H = Tℓ. Next, from the definition of r
Q
i (S), we know that |H| = ℓ.
Also, every element in H will have a rank at most ℓ (since for each such set S′, vi(S
′) ≤ vi(S)) and
every element outside of H will have a rank larger than ℓ (since for each such set S′, vi(S
′) > vi(S)).
Hence, i) follows.
To prove the second part, consider the largest ℓ′ ≤ ℓ such that there exists some S ⊆ Q with
r
Q
i (S) = ℓ
′. Now, from i) we know that the number of subsets of Q with rank at most ℓ′ is exactly
ℓ′ and hence from our choice of ℓ′ the statement follows. 
Claim 3. Let A = (A1, · · · , An) be an allocation, and i, j ∈ [n] be some agents. If Kij = Ai ∪Aj ,
then
r
Kij
i (Ai) > 2
|Kij |−1 ⇔ vi(Ai) ≥
vi(Kij)
2
.
Proof: (⇒) Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that ℓ = r
Kij
i (Ai) > 2
|Kij |−1, but vi(Ai) <
vi(Kij)
2 . Since ℓ > 2
|Kij |−1, we know from Claim 2(i) that there exists S and Sc = Kij \S, such that
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r
Kij
i (S) ≤ r
Kij
i (Ai) and r
Kij
i (S
c) ≤ r
Kij
i (Ai). This in turn implies that using Claim 1(i) we have
that vi(S) ≤ vi(Ai) <
vi(Kij)
2 and vi(S
c) ≤ vi(Ai) <
vi(Kij)
2 , which is impossible since the valuation
functions are additive.
(⇐) Let A be an allocation such that vi(Ai) ≥
vi(Kij)
2 , but r
Kij
i (Ai) ≤ 2
|Kij |−1. Now, consider
the set H1 = {P | P ⊆ Kij , r
Kij
i (P ) > r
Kij
i (Ai)}. From Claim 2(i) and using the fact that
r
Kij
i (Ai) ≤ 2
|Kij |−1 we know that |H1| ≥ 2
|Kij |−1. Also, note that every set in H1 has, by Claim 1(i),
value greater than vi(Ai). Next, consider H2 = {P
c | P ∈ H1, P
c = Kij \ P}, where additivity
implies that every set in H2 has value less than vi(A1). Note that |H1| + |H2| ≥ 2
|Kij | and Ai is
neither in H1 nor H2, which is impossible. 
B.3 Omitted proofs from Section 4.4
Theorem 4. Given an instance with m indivisible goods and n ≥ 2 agents with additive valuation
functions, the rank-leximin algorithm (Algorithm 1) returns an allocation A that is PMMS and PO
if all the agents report ordinally equivalent valuation functions.
Proof: To prove this we will show how rank-Leximin always returns a PMMS and PO allocation
(A1, · · · , An) for agents with identical valuation functions. Once we have that, then the theorem
follows by repeated application of Observation 3 and by observing that the rank-leximin algorithm
produces the same output for two instances that are equivalent.
First, note that we already know from the proof of Theorem 3 that it is PO with respect to any
instance with n agents. So we just need to argue that it produces a PMMS allocation when the
reports are identical. To see this, recall from Theorem 2 that we need to show that for all i, j ∈ [n],
min{rQi (Ai), r
Q
j (Aj)} ≥ 2
k−1, where Q = Ai ∪Aj and k = |Q|.
Suppose this was not the case and there existed agents i, j such that rQi (Ai) < 2
k−1. Now, let us
consider the set H = {S | S ⊆ Q and rQj (S) > r
Q
i (Ai)} and let k = Q. Since r
Q
i (Ai) < 2
k−1, we
know from Claim 2(ii) that |H| > 2k−1 (since there are 2k subsets of Q in total). This in turn
implies that, there is a set S and its complement Sc, such that both rQj (S) and r
Q
j (S
c) are greater
than rQi (Ai). So, now, consider these sets S and S
c, and ask agent i to pick the one she values the
most. Let us assume without loss of generality that this is S. Note that since the valuations are
additive and hence vi(S) ≥
1
2vi(Q) > vi(Ai), we know from Claim 3 that r
Q
i (S) ≥ 2
k−1 > r
Q
i (Ai).
This in turn implies that,
min{rQi (S), r
Q
j (S
c)} > rQi (Ai) ≥ min{r
Q
i (Ai), r
Q
j (Aj)}
⇒min{rQi (S), r
Q
i (S
c)} > rQi (Ai) ≥ min{r
Q
i (Ai), r
Q
i (Aj)},
where the implication follows from the fact that i and j have identical valuation functions and so
for any S ⊆ G and A ⊆ S, we have rSi (A) = r
S
j (A).
The observation above implies that we can use Claim 1(ii) to see that,
min{rGi (S), r
G
i (S
c)} > min{rGi (Ai), r
G
i (Aj)}
⇒min{rGi (S), r
G
j (S
c)} > min{rGi (Ai), r
G
j (Aj)},
where the implication again follows from the fact that i and j have identical valuation functions.
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Now, consider the allocation A′ = (A1, · · · , Ai−1, S,Ai+1, · · · , Aj−1, S
c, Aj+1, · · · , An). From the
discussion above we know that A ≺ A′ according to the rank-LeximinCMP operator in Algorithm 1.
However, this contradicts the fact that A was the allocation that was returned by the rank-Leximin
algorithm. 
B.4 Omitted proofs from Section 4.4.1
Claim 4. Let v be an additive utility function and for some α > 0, let v′ ∈ α-N(v). Then, for any
S1, S2 ⊆ G,
i) |v(S1)− v
′(S1)| ≤
α
2
ii) if v(S1) > v(S2) and v
′(S1) ≤ v
′(S2), then v(S1)− v(S2) ≤ α.
Proof: To prove the first part, first, note that for x, y ∈ R, |x− y| ≥ (x− y) and |x− y| ≥ (y−x).
Next, let us denote the set G \ S1 by S
c
1. So, now, let us assume that |v(S1)− v
′(S1)| >
α
2 . Since
v, v′ are additive, we know that v(S1)+ v(S
c
1) = T (and similarly for v
′), and so this in turn implies
that |v′(Sc1)− v(S
c
1)| >
α
2 . So, using this, we have,∑
g∈G
∣∣v(g) − v′(g)∣∣ = ∑
g∈S1
∣∣v(g) − v′(g)∣∣ + ∑
g∈Sc
1
∣∣v′(g)− v(g)∣∣
≥
∑
g∈S1
(v′(g) − v(g)) +
∑
g∈Sc
1
(v(g) − v′(g))
= (v′(S1)− v(S1)) + (v(S
c
1)− v
′(Sc1))
> α,
which is a contradiction since v′ ∈ α-N(v).
To prove the second part, observe that from the first part we have,
v(S1)− v(S2) ≤ v
′(S1) +
α
2
− (v′(S2)−
α
2
)
= v′(S1)− v
′(S2) + α
≤ α,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that v′(S1) ≤ v
′(S2). 
Claim 5. Given an instance with m indivisible goods and two agents with additive valuation func-
tions, let (A1, A2) be a PMMS allocation. If for an agent i ∈ [2], k = |Aj | ≥ 2, where j 6= i,
then
i) vi(Ai) ≥ vi(M
j
i ), where M
j
i is the maximum valued good of agent i in the bundle Aj
ii) vi(Aj)− vi(Ai) ≤ vi(m
j
i ), where m
j
i is the minimum valued good of agent i in the bundle Aj
iii) vi(Ai) ≥
k−1
2k−1T .
Proof: To prove the first part, let us assume that vi(Ai) < vi(M
j
i ). Since k ≥ 2, we have an
another good g ∈ Aj such that g 6= M
j
i . So, now, consider the allocation (Ai ∪ {g}, {M
j
i }). Note
that using additivity we have that min{vi(Ai ∪ {g}), vi(M
)
i } > vi(Ai), which in turn contradicts
the fact that (Ai, Aj) is a PMMS allocation.
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To prove the second part, let us assume that vi(Aj)−vi(Ai) > vi(m
j
i ). Next, consider the allocation
(Ai∪{m
j
i}, Aj \{m
j
i}). Note that using additivity we have that min{vi(Ai∪{m
j
i}), vi(Aj \{m
j
i})} >
vi(Ai), which in turn contradicts the fact that (Ai, Aj) is a PMMS allocation.
To prove the third part, observe that from the second part we know that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj)− vi(m
j
i ).
Also, if k = |Aj |, then we can use the fact that the valuation functions are additive to see that
vi(m
j
i ) ≤
vi(Aj)
k
. So, using these, we have,
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj)− vi(m
j
i ) ≥ vi(Aj)−
vi(Aj)
k
= (T − vi(Ai))
(
k − 1
k
)
,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that vi(Ai) + vi(Aj) = T .
Finally, rearranging the term above we have our claim. 
Claim 6. Given an instance with m indivisible goods and two agents with additive valuation func-
tions, let (A1, A2) be the allocation that is returned by the rank-leximin algorithm for this instance.
If k1 = r
G
1 (A1) and k2 = r
G
2 (A2), then min{k1, k2} ≥ 2
m−1 and max{k1, k2} > 2
m−1.
Proof: Since rank-leximin produces a PMMS allocation (Theorem 3), we know from Theorem 2
that min{k1, k2} ≥ 2
m−1. Also, if max{k1, k2} ≤ 2
m−1, then using Claim 3 we have that v1(A1) <
T
2
and v2(A2) <
T
2 . However, this in turn contradicts the fact that rank-leximin is Pareto-optimal
(Theorem 3) since swapping the bundles improves the utilities of both the agents. 
B.4.1 Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 6. For α > 0, if v′1 ∈ α-N(v1), rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2), and rank-leximin(v
′
1, v2) =
(S1, S2), then
v1(S1)
v1(A1)
≤ 2.
Proof: To prove this, let us consider the following three cases. Note that since rank-leximin returns
a PMMS allocation (Theorem 3) we know from Theorem 2 that these are the only three cases. Also,
note that the bound is trivially true when v1(A1)− v1(S1) ≥ 0. So below we directly consider the
case when v1(S1) > v1(A1).
Case 1. r1(A1) > 2
m−1: Since r1(A1) > 2
m−1, we know using Claim 3 that v1(A1) ≥
T
2 . Therefore,
using this and the fact that v(S1) ≤ T , we have,
v1(S1)
v1(A1)
≤ 2. (4)
Case 2. r1(A1) = 2
m−1 and |S1| = 1: First, observe that since |S1| = 1 and v1(A1) < v1(S1), we
have that S1 ⊆ A2. This in turn implies v1(S1) ≤ v1(A2) and so using this we have
v1(S1)
v1(A1)
≤
v1(A2)
v1(A1)
. (5)
Now, in order to upper-bound (5), consider the following two cases.
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i) |A2| ≥ 2: Let k = |A2|. Since k ≥ 2, we know from Claim 5 that v1(A1) ≥
k−1
2k−1T . So, using
this, we have
v1(A2)
v1(A1)
=
T − v1(A1)
v1(A1)
≤
k
k − 1
≤ 2. (6)
ii) |A2| = 1: Since |A2| = 1 and from above we know that S1 ⊆ A2, we have that S1 = A2.
This in turn implies that rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2) and rank-leximin(v
′
1, v2) = (A2, A1).
Now, consider the following observations.
a) r1(A1) = 2
m−1 (recall that this is the case we are considering)
b) r2(A2) = 2
m−1 + 1 (since |A2| = 1, we know that r2(A2) ≤ 2
m−1 + 1, because valuation
functions are additive and so any singleton set can have rank at most 2m−1+1. However,
r2(A2) ≥ 2
m−1 + 1, using Claim 6.)
c) r′1(A1) = 2
m−1 (since |A1| = m − 1, we know that r
′
1(A1) ≥ 2
m−1. However, r′1(A1) <
2m−1 +1, for if not then (A1, A2) ≻v′
1
,v2 (A2, A1), thus contradicting the fact that rank-
leximin(v′1, v2) = (A2, A1))
d) r1(A2) = 2
m−1 + 1 (since |A2| = 1⇒ r1(A2) ≤ 2
m−1 + 1, and r1(A2) > r1(A1) since we
are considering the case when v1(S1) = v1(A2) > v1(A1))
e) r2(A1) = 2
m−1 (since |A1| = m− 1⇒ r2(A1) ≥ 2
m−1, and r2(A1) < 2
m−1 + 1, for if not
then (A2, A1) ≻v1,v2 (A1, A2), thus contradicting the fact that rank-leximin(v1, v2) =
(A1, A2))
f) r′1(A2) = 2
m−1+1 (since |A2| = 1⇒ r
′
1(A2) ≤ 2
m−1+1, and r2(A1) = 2
m−1 ⇒ r′1(A2) ≥
2m−1 + 1 using Claim 6)
Now, combining all the observations above, we can see that (A1, A2) ≡v1,v2 (A2, A1) and
(A1, A2) ≡v′
1
,v2 (A2, A1). However, note that this in turn is a contradiction because the
rank-leximin algorithm breaks ties deterministically and so it couldn’t have been the case
that rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2) and rank-leximin(v
′
1, v2) = (A2, A1). Hence, this case is
impossible.
Case 3. r1(A1) = 2
m−1 and |S1| ≥ 2: First, note that since v1(S1) > v1(A1), r1(A1) = 2
m−1, and
rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2), we have that, for all g ∈ S1, v1(S1 \{g}) ≤ v1(A1). Why? Suppose
if not, then consider the allocation (S1 \{g}), S2 ∪{g}), and observe that (S1 \{g}), S2 ∪{g}) ≻v1,v2
(A1, A2), which in turn contradicts the fact that rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2). So, now, by
adding up all the inequalities with respect all g ∈ S1, we have,
(|S1| − 1)v1(S1) ≤ |S1|v1(A1).
This implies that we can use the fact that |S1| ≥ 2 to see that
v1(S1)
v1(A1)
≤
|S1|
|S1| − 1
≤ 2. (7)
Finally, combining (4), (6), and (7), we have our lemma. 
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B.4.2 Proof of Lemma 7
Lemma 7. For α ∈ (0, T3 ], if v
′
1 ∈ α-N(v1), rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2), and rank-leximin(v
′
1,
v2) = (S1, S2), then
v1(S1)
v1(A1)
≥
1
2 + 12α
T
.
Proof: Since we are trying to show a lower bound for v1(S1)
v1(A1)
, below we consider the case when
v1(A1) > v1(S1), since otherwise it is trivially lower-bounded by 1. Also, note we can directly
consider the case when v1(S2) > v1(S1), for otherwise v1(S1) = T − v1(S2) ≥
T
2 and so
v1(S1)
v1(A1)
≥ 12 .
Therefore, throughout this proof, we have v1(S2) >
T
2 .
Next, let us consider the following cases. Note that these are the only three cases using Claim 6
with respect to the allocation (S1, S2).
Case 1. r′1(S1) > 2
m−1: Since r′1(S1) > 2
m−1, we know from Claim 3 that v′1(S1) ≥
T
2 . Also, since
‖v1 − v
′
1‖1 ≤ α and v1(G) = v
′
1(G) = T , it is easy to see that v
′
1(S1)− v1(S1) ≤
α
2 . So, using these,
we have,
v1(S1)
v1(A1)
≥
T
2 −
α
2
v1(A1)
≥
T
2 −
α
2
T
≥
1
2 + 4α
T
, (8)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that α ∈ (0, T3 ].
Case 2. r′1(S1) = 2
m−1 and min{r1(A1), r2(A2)} = r1(A1): Since min{r1(A1), r2(A2)} = r1(A1)
and rank-leximin(v′1, v2) = (S1, S2), we have that v
′
1(A1) ≤ v
′
1(S1), for if not, then it is easy to
see that (A1, A2) ≻(v′
1
,v2) (S1, S2), thus contradicting the fact that rank-leximin(v
′
1, v2) = (S1, S2).
Also, since v1(A1) > v1(S1) and from above we have v
′
1(A1) ≤ v
′
1(S1), from Claim 4(ii) we have
know that v1(A1)− v1(S1) ≤ α. So, now, let us consider the following two cases.
i) |S2| = 1: First, note that since |S2| = 1 and v1(A1) > v1(S1), we have that S2 ⊆ A1. This in
turn implies that v1(A1) > v1(S2) >
T
2 . So, now, using these we have,
v1(S1)
v1(A1)
≥
v1(A1)− α
v1(A1)
> 1−
2α
T
≥
1
2 + 4α
T
, (9)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that α ∈ (0, T3 ].
ii) |S2| ≥ 2: Let k = |S2|. Now, since v1(A1)− v1(S1) ≤ α, we have,
v1(S1)
v1(A1)
≥
v1(S1)
v1(S1) + α
= 1−
α
v1(S1) + α
≥ 1−
α
v′1(S1)−
α
2 + α
(using Claim 4(i))
≥ 1−
α
k−1
2k−1T +
α
2
(using Claim 5(iii))
≥
1
2 + 4α
T
, (10)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that α ∈ (0, T3 ].
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Case 3. r′1(S1) = 2
m−1 and min{r1(A1), r2(A2)} = r2(A2): First, note that we can directly
consider the case when min{r1(A1), r2(A2)} = r2(A2) = 2
m−1, for if not then we either have
v′1(A1) ≤ v
′
1(S1), which can be handled as in Case 2, or we have that v
′
1(A1) > v
′
1(S1), which is im-
possible since this would imply min{r′1(A1), r2(A2)} > 2
m−1 = r′1(S1) = min{r
′
1(S1), r2(S2)}, thus
contradicting the fact that rank-leximin(v′1, v2) = (S1, S2). Additionally, since we are considering
the case when r2(A2) = 2
m−1, we have from Claim 6 that r1(A1) ≥ 2
m−1+1, which in turn implies,
using Claim 3, that v1(A1) ≥
T
2 .
Given the observations above, let us now consider the following cases.
i) |S2| ≥ 2 and |S1 ∩ A1| ≥ 1: Let k = |S2| and let X ⊂ G such that r1(X) = 2
m−1.
Since rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2) and ∀g ∈ G, and ∀i ∈ [2], vi(g) > 0, we have that
r1(A1 \ {g}) ≤ 2
m−1, for if not then min{r1(A1 \ {g}), r2(A2 ∪ {g})} > 2
m−1 = r2(A2) =
min{r1(A1), r2(A2)}, thus contradicting the fact that rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2). So,
next, let us consider a good g ∈ S1 ∩A1. Using the observations above, we have,
v1(A1) ≤ v1(X) + v1(g)
(
since r1(A1 \ {g}) ≤ 2
m−1
)
≤ v1(X) + v1(S1) (since v1(g) ≤ v1(S1))
≤ 2v1(S1) + α,
where the last inequality is true because either v1(s1) ≥ v1(X) or if not then it is easy to see
that since r′1(S1) ≥ 2
m−1, there exists an H ⊂ G such that v1(H) ≥ v1(X) > v1(S1), but
v′1(H) ≤ v
′
1(S1). This in turn implies, we can use Claim 4(ii), to see that v1(H)− v1(S) ≤ α.
So, now, using these, we have,
v1(S1)
v1(A1)
≥
1
2
−
α
2v1(A1)
≥
1
2
−
α
T
(
since v1(A1) ≥
T
2
)
≥
1
2 + 12α
T
, (11)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that α ∈ (0, T3 ].
ii) |S2| ≥ 2 and |S1 ∩ A1| = 0: Let k = |S2|. First, note that since |S1 ∩A1| = 0, we have that
A1 ⊆ S2. Therefore, using this, we have,
v1(S1)
v1(A1)
≥
v1(S1)
v1(S2)
≥
v′1(S1)−
α
2
v′1(S2) +
α
2
≥
k−1
2k−1T −
α
2
k
2k−1T +
α
2
(using Claim 5(iii))
≥
1
2 + 12α
T
, (12)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that k ≥ 2 and α ∈ (0, T3 ].
iii) |S2| = 1: First, note that since |S2| = 1, r2(S2) ≤ 2
m−1 + 1, as additivity implies that any
singleton set can have rank at most 2m−1 + 1. Also, recall that we are considering the case
when r′1(S1) = r2(A2) = 2
m−1. Now, since rank-lexmin(v′1, v2) = (S1, S2), we need to have
v′1(S1) ≥ v
′
1(A1), for if not, then the fact that r2(A2) = 2
m−1 and v′1(A1) > v
′
1(S1) implies
that (A1, A2) v1,v2 (S1, S2) and (A1, A2) v′1,v2 (S1, S2). However, this is impossible since
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the rank-leximin algorithm uses a deterministic tie-breaking rule and hence if this is case,
then rank-leximin(v1, v2) and rank-leximin(v
′
1, v2) cannot be different. Therefore, we have
that v′1(S1) ≥ v
′
1(A1), which in turn can again be handled as in Case 2.
Finally, combining (8), (9), (10), (11), and (12), we have that v1(S1)
v1(A1
≥ 1
2+ 12α
T
. 
B.4.3 Proof of Theorem 8
Theorem 8. Given an instance with m indivisible goods and two agents with additive valuation
functions, let M be an algorithm that always returns a PMMS allocation. Then, for α ≤ T3 ,
modified-M, which refers to the change as described in Algorithm 2, is (4+6α
T
)-weakly-approximately-
stable.
Proof: We begin by arguing that ifM produces a PMMS allocation then so does modified-M. To
see this, note that we just need to show that the allocation A = ({g},G \ {g}) is PMMS in the case
when agent 1 has a good g of value greater than T2 (since if this is not the case then modified-M
returns the same outcome as M), and this fact in turn is easy to see because agent 1 is envy-free
and agent 2 gets m− 1 goods.
Given that modified-M is guaranteed to produce a PMMS allocation, it just remains to show
the bound on weak-approximate-stability. As we did in the proof of Theorem 5, we proceed by
considering two agents with utility functions v1, v2. Since the algorithm is not symmetric, we need
to consider what happens when each agent misreports. So, throughout, for some α ∈ (0, T3 ], we
denote the misreport by agent i ∈ [2] as v′i, and let (−i) denote the agent (i + 1) mod 2. Also,
let rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2), and, for i ∈ [2], let rank-leximin(v
′
i, v−i) = (S1, S2). Given an
instance, we will say that the instance is in ‘Phase 1’ (this corresponds to the first return statement
in Algorithm 2) if agent 1 has a good of value greater than T2 , and if there is no such good, then
we will say that the instance is in ‘Phase 2.’ Also, throughout, for i ∈ [2], we use gmaxi to denote
the highest valued good in G according to agent i (recall that, since v′i ∈ α-N(vi), g
max
i is the same
in vi and v
′
i.)
Equipped with the notations above, let us now consider the following cases. Note that since the
allocation returned is identical whenever an instance is in Phase 1, we only need to analyze these
cases.
Case 1. (v1, v2) is in Phase 1, (v
′
i, v−i) is in Phase 2: First, since there is a change in phase
due to misreporting, note that i = 1, since the choice of phase only depends on agent 1’s valuation
function. Given this, below we derive an upper and lower bound for the ratio v1(S1)
v1(A1)
.
To upper bound the ratio, note that since (v1, v2) in Phase 1, we have that A1 = {g
max
1 } and
v1(g
max
1 ) >
T
2 . This implies,
v1(S1)
v1(A1)
=
v1(S1)
v1(gmax1 )
≤
T
v1(gmax1 )
< 2. (13)
Next, to lower bound the ratio, let us consider the following two cases.
i) |S2| = 1: In this case, since (S1, S2) is PMMS, we know that v′1(S1) ≥ v
′
1(G \ {g
max
1 }). Also,
since (v′i, v−i) in Phase 2, we know that v
′
1(g
max
1 ) ≤
T
2 . So, now, using these and Claim 4(i),
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we have
v1(S1)
v1(A1)
≥
v′1(S1)−
α
2
v1(A1)
≥
v′1(G \ {g
max
1 })−
α
2
v1(A1)
≥
T
2 −
α
2
T
≥
1
2 + 4α
T
, (14)
where the last inequality follows since α ∈ (0, T3 ].
ii) |S2| ≥ 2: Let k = |S2|. Since k ≥ 2, we can use Claim 4(i) and Claim 5(iii), to see that
v1(S1)
v1(A1)
≥
v′1(S1)−
α
2
v1(A1)
≥
k−1
2k−1T −
α
2
T
≥
1
4 + 6α
T
, (15)
where the last inequality follows from the facts that k ≥ 2 and α ∈ (0, T3 ].
Case 2. (v1, v2) is in Phase 2, (v
′
i, v−i) is in Phase 1: Similar to the previous case, here again
we have i = 1. Also, since (v′1, v2) in Phase 1, we have that S1 = {g
max
1 } and v
′
1(g
max
1 ) >
T
2 . Just
like in the previous case, we again upper and lower bound the ratio v1(S1)
v1(A1)
.
For the upper bound, first note that since (v1, v2) in Phase 2, we have v1(g
max
1 ) ≤
T
2 . Next, note
that we only need to consider the case when gmax1 ∈ A2 ,since otherwise the ratio is upper-bounded
by 1. Also, if |A2| = 1, then note that v1(A1) ≥ T − v1(g
max
1 ) ≥
T
2 , and so if this is the case then
again the ratio is upper-bounded by 1. Finally, if k = |A2| ≥ 2, then we can use Claim 5(iii) to see
that,
v1(S1)
v1(A1)
=
v1(g
max
1 )
v1(A1)
≤
T
2
k−1
2k−1T
≤
3
2
. (16)
For the lower bound, note that since v′1(g
max
1 ) >
T
2 , we can use Claim 4(i) to see that,
v1(S1)
v1(A1)
=
v1(g
max
1 )
v1(A1)
≥
T
2 −
α
2
T
≥
1
2 + 4α
T
, (17)
where the last inequality follows since α ∈ (0, T3 ].
Case 3. (v1, v2) is in Phase 2, (v
′
i, v−i) is in Phase 2: Let i ∈ [2] be the agent who is misreporting.
First for the lower bound, we can proceed exactly as in Cases 1(i) and 1(ii) above. So we only
show an upper bound below. To do this, first note that since we are in Phase 2, so vi(g
max
i ) ≤
T
2 .
Therefore, let us consider the two cases below.
i) |A−i| = 1: In this case, since (A1, A2) is PMMS, we know that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(G \ {g
max
i }). So,
using this, we have,
vi(Si)
vi(Ai)
≤
T
T − v(gmaxi )
≤ 2. (18)
ii) |A−i| ≥ 2: Let k = |A−i|. Since k ≥ 2, we can use Claim 5(iii), to see that
vi(Si)
vi(Ai)
≤
T
k−1
2k−1T
≤ 3. (19)
Finally, combining all the observations, (13)-(19), from above we have our theorem. 
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